近年來國內外大型知名企業發生一連串之舞弊案件，造成投資人及其他利害關係人的權益受到侵害。本文旨在探討公司在面臨衰退時，是否會採取盈餘管理行為；並檢視其它的內外部監督機制能否有效減少此種盈餘管理行為的產生。本文以2002年至2011年台灣上市(櫃)公司為樣本，使用裁決性應計數作為盈餘管理的衡量變數，並採用OLS迴歸分析。實證結果顯示：衰退組織比起正常營運公司有較多的盈餘管理行為；但若該衰退組織聘請四大會計師事務所查核其財務報表或獨立董監事的比例較高，則能顯著降低其盈餘管理行為。本研究可做為一般投資人選擇投資標的及其它利害關係人之參考依據。 In recent years, the scandals of fraud of large well-known enterprises in Taiwan and in America, resulting in the interests of investors and other interested parties are infringed. The purpose of the study is therefore to investigate whether the company will commit earnings management when in the face of decline; and look up whether other internal and external oversight mechanisms are effective in reducing such earnings management behavior. Data were collected from the prospectuses of the listed companies (including OTC companies) in Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2002 to 2011. We use discretionary accruals as a variable measurement of earnings management , and OLS regression analysis. The empirical results show that: the declining organization have more earnings management behavior compared to the normal operating company; However if the declining organizations with Big4 auditor or independent directors and supervisors can significantly reduce the earnings management behavior. This study can be used as general investors to choose investment targets.