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標題: 銀行貸款、公開與私有公司債的決定因素
The Determinants of Bank Loans, Public Bonds, and Private Placement Bonds
作者: 蘇德勇
To, Duc-Dung
Contributors: 林宜勉
Yi-Mien Lin
會計學研究所
關鍵字: 銀行貸款;公開公司債;私有公司債;會計品質;管理防禦;錯誤訂價
Bank loans;Public bonds;Private placement bonds;Accounting quality;Managerial entrenchment;Mispricing of equity
日期: 2013
Issue Date: 2013-11-19 12:53:53 (UTC+8)
Publisher: 會計學研究所
摘要: 本研究考慮三種債務融資活動,即銀行貸款活動,公開公司債活動及私有公司債活動,以探討會計品質與不同債務融資選擇之間的關聯性。 另外,由於有很少文章考慮錯誤定價的角色,也未運用它來解釋會計品質與債務融資之間的關聯性,再加上之前的文獻也很少討論到錯誤定價的持久性影響,故本文也控制股票的錯誤定價對債務融資行為之影響。最後,當控制了會計品質與股票的錯誤訂價對債務融資活動之影響後,本文進一步探討管理防禦對債務融資活動與選擇之影響。在此,本文採用董事長任期與董事長兼任總經理作為管理防禦的代替變數。
研究結果發現,當考慮錯誤定價的影響後,會計品質較差之企業較不會採用銀行貸款融資活動來增加資金,而較偏好採用公開公司債融資方式(包含在OLS 模型與內線性轉換模型)。首先,在OLS模型中我們發現,應計項目與錯誤定價對企業的銀行貸款活動呈現正相關,而對企業的公開公司債活動則無關。此顯示,如果企業的股票發生錯價時,會計品質較差之企業會選擇銀行貸款來增加資金,這相對意味著會計品質較差及股票發生錯價之企業較難在公開資本市場進行融資。然而,在內生性轉換模型中發現,應計項目與錯誤定價對公開公司債融資呈顯著負向影響,而對銀行貸款融資活動則無關。
另一方面,當控制錯誤定價與會計品質對債務融資活動之影響後發現,內部控制較差之企業,亦即企業的董事長任期較長與同時兼任總經理時,企業較不會從事銀行貸款融資,而是偏好發行公開公司債來滿足企業的融資需求。此外,本文也發現董事長任期與錯誤定價交互影響對銀行貸款活動呈現負向影響,但對公開公司債融資活動則無關。另外發現,董事長兼任與錯誤定價交互影響對銀行貸款與公開公司債融資活動呈顯著無關。這些結果也意味著錯誤定價在企業的債務融資活動中扮演著重要的角色。
This paper considers three types of debt financing, namely, bank loans, public bonds, and private bonds, and explores the relationship between accounting quality and different types of debt financing choices (and activities). Moreover, because there are few articles that consider the role of mispricing in explaining the relationships between accounting quality and debt financing and the previous literature has debated the permanence of the market timing effects of mispriced equity, this study controls for the effect of equity mispricing on debt financing behavior. Finally, this study also considers the effects of managerial entrenchment on debt financing activities or choices, after controlling for accounting quality and equity mispricing, through the use of two proxies: CEO tenure and CEO duality.
The findings of OLS and Endogenous Switch models show that after considering equity mispricing, firms with poor accounting quality do not prefer to employ bank loan financing but rather tend to use public bonds. We find that in OLS models, the interaction term of Accruals and Misprice is positively related to the bank loan activities of firms and unrelated to their use of public bonds. The above results imply that among firms whose equity is mispriced, those with poor accounting quality prefer to use bank loans to raise capital through debt financing. A possible reason for this is that it is more difficult for firms with poor accounting quality and mispriced equity to raise capital through the public capital markets. However, the evidence from the Endogenous Switch models shows that the interaction term of Accruals and Misprice is negatively related to public bond financing and unrelated to bank loan activities.
In addition, after controlling for equity mispricing and accounting quality, the evidence indicates that firms with poor internal controls, that is, those whose CEOs have longer tenures and hold dual positions, do not tend to employ bank loan financing but rather tend to issue public bonds. We also find that the interaction term of CEO Tenure and Misprice is negatively related to bank loan activities and is unrelated to the issuance of public bonds. Meanwhile, the interaction term of CEO Duality and Misprice is unrelated to both bank loan and public bond financing activities. These results imply that the equity mispricing of firms is an important determinant of their debt financing policies.
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